4hw.org: Recently, the presidential election of South Korea has ended. Park Geun hye, former president of South Korea, has completely ended her presidential career and entered prison life. In front of the new president of South Korea is Sade, a hot potato. How will the new president of South Korea take over?
South Korea's new president, Wen zaiyin, was sworn in a few days ago. What lies ahead of him is the 'mess' left by park Geun hye's era. The United States intervened excessively in South Korea and intervened in the Korean issue. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is also in a tense state. The biggest problem before him is Sade. How will the new president of South Korea deal with the Sade issue? What is the attitude of the new president of South Korea towards the Sade incident What measures will be taken?
On May 10, Wen was elected as the new president of South Korea in Yin. A new round of Korean Peninsula crisis, or the Korean Peninsula crisis triggered by the deployment of Sade system, the assassination of Kim Jong Un, the continuous test firing of intermediate / short-range ballistic missiles by North Korea and the preparation for the sixth nuclear test since last year, seems to have eased to some extent.
We can sort out the statements of all parties concerned. First of all, on May 1, President trump announced that he was "willing to invite Kim Jong Un to visit the United States under appropriate circumstances". Although the so-called "Kim Jong Un's visit to the United States" is impossible under the condition that the DPRK must stop developing missiles and give up nuclear weapons "proposed by the United States, the DPRK and the United States still held semi official and semi civilian contacts in a Nordic country in the atmosphere of such dialogue.
Then came the measures taken by the newly elected president of South Korea, Wen zaiyin: at the same time of expressing the attitude of "fighting against North Korea's provocation" through the South Korean military, a lot of goodwill was released to the north, including supporting the implementation of the "sunshine policy", reopening the Kaesong Industrial Park previously closed by President Park Geun hye, suggesting that both sides strive for national reconciliation through dialogue and consultation, and even sign a peace agreement.
On the other hand, North Korea also paid tribute to Mr. Wen zaiyin's election. Not only through the report of the official news agency, but also by calling Mr. Wen zaiyin's election "the victory of Candlelight", which greatly highlights the main significance of the South Korean people, and puts forward high expectations for the new president, such as stopping the joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, improving the situation on the peninsula, and making the North-South pattern towards the national unity The first direction is continuous progress.
Also noteworthy is the attitude of the Chinese side. On the evening of May 11, the news program broadcasted the telephone reports of the leaders of China and South Korea. As far as the current situation is concerned, the basic attitude of China is to ask Mr. Wen Diyin to understand and recognize China's reasonable security concerns and face up to China's national interests.
Generally speaking, it can be summed up in two points: first, the Sade system, which directly causes the contradiction between China and South Korea, China requires the South Korean side to reconsider and even remove the system as soon as possible, so as to ensure that China's national interests will not be harmed; second, the Korean nuclear issue, in addition to the consistent "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula", "failure to produce war and chaos" and "proposal to solve the problem through the six-party talks as a framework of dialogue" Besides, there is no updated content.
The public opinion tends to be optimistic to a certain extent. The experience of Mr. Wen's life and political career given by most of the media also deepens this optimism to a certain extent: refugees from the Korean War, civil rights lawyers, South Korean leftists, boycotts of American influence, and close friends of President Roh moo Hyun. Such descriptions have undoubtedly created some impressions of the 'democratic' personage: This is a person who is good at talking and communicating, the deployment of Sade system may have a turning point, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may stabilize again, which should be a great benefit to China in general.
To some extent, the author agrees with the view that there may be a turnaround in Sade's problem, but at the same time, we should not have too much hope for such a turnaround It is true that the Sade system has too many problems in decision-making and deployment. The black box state in decision-making and the hidden black gold politics, as well as the process of taking advantage of people's danger and taking advantage of chaos in deployment, all show this. If it is to be true, there must be a lot of articles to do. But from the perspective of overall consideration, Mr. Wen zaiyin needs to put a big question mark if he wants to do so, whether he will do so, and where he will go. Although the reconsideration of the Sade system will help President Wen zaiyin establish a good image of so-called "Korean independence" and "resistance to the influence of American forces", which seems to be worth doing, there are several factors that must be taken into account:
The first is back to Sade's decision-making and deployment process. The deployment of Sade system shows that the water is very deep. Since the water is very deep, it is obviously not a good strategy to go to the "deep water area of reform" at the beginning of taking office. The interests of all parties involved are too deep, and a little carelessness may cause fire. After all, the former President Park Geun hye's "girlfriends in politics" is still full of doubts. The deployment of Sade system will also restrict wenzaiyin's "re tossing once" because of its great tearing and deep tossing to Korean society.
Second, return to the new president, Mr. Wen zaiyin himself. We always say that "people create history, but they don't create history at will, but they often create history from the previous inherited conditions". In a country like South Korea with a profound political tradition of plutocracy, many plutocracy are inextricably linked with the United States, the U.S. Army and the South Korean army. The author believes that there is a country that can completely get rid of the control of plutocracy and can completely eliminate it It is not entirely impossible for a president to influence the United States, but we should not expect too much of this possibility. After all, it is unclear how Mr. Roh moo Hyun, an ally and close friend of President Wen zaiyin, died.
In general, the new president Wen is not motivated enough or willing enough to uncover the cover of Sade's deployment. Judging from his current practice, he has adopted an opportunistic approach, which has the trend of turning the Sade issue into a balance of power diplomacy. On the one hand, he sent special envoys and delegations to explain and consult with China. Compared with the previous caretaker government's handling of "don't care, talk to yourself", this approach has made some progress, but it has not made much progress for China The explanation can only be understood as seeking China's understanding, but the extent to which the consultation is conducted is not as follows at all;
On the other hand, Mr. Wen zaiyin has repeatedly stressed the importance of the "U.S. - South Korea alliance" and tends to adopt the referendum model to solve the legitimacy of the Sade system deployment in the public opinion and legal procedures of South Korea. This way seems to be the most impartial, but in the process of operation, it is the most easy to be affected by the relevant parties in the implementation process, media influence and social public relations. Obviously, from the analysis of the influence on the main media and civil society in South Korea, if we really want to adopt the referendum model, China does not have much cards to play.
Therefore, to sum up the above points, the author believes that maybe president Wen zaiyin has the idea of removing the Sade system, but many factors such as the real environment and diplomatic strategy are not conducive to or allow him to do so, and China's measures under the new president's strategy seem to be relatively limited, which is not worth over optimism.
Most importantly, we should remember the chairman's words: dust will not run away without a broom. For us, in the face of the dilemma in China South Korea relations caused by the Sade system, we need to make good use of the current channels of dialogue between China and South Korea, strive for national interests through diplomatic channels, at least let the problems develop in the direction beneficial to me, and force South Korea to stop deploying the Sade system with full detection performance; we need to adhere to the strong military line and continue to improve our own space base After all, if we can solve the problem through negotiation, what should we do with national forces backed by political, economic, military and ideological strength?
The author believes that the deployment of the Sade system is only a current and small challenge for Wen in the Yin government and China. The key is to take this incident as an opportunity to express our country's intention of resolutely and deeply participating in the situation on the peninsula and the whole process of political transformation on the peninsula, which shows our country's basic attitude that we cannot ignore the interests of our country. Because, compared with the Sade system, the bigger and more complex challenge is still to come: the North Korean nuclear issue.
Up to now, the development of North Korea's nuclear issue can be described as "protracted and endless". When it is said to be 'delayed for a long time', it means that it has been delayed, and has been delayed for a long time. From 1956, North Korea sent the first batch of researchers to the Dubna Institute of the Soviet Union, to 1992-1994, the first nuclear weapons crisis broke out on the Korean Peninsula, to 2003, China hosted the first six-party talks, to 2006-2016, North Korea carried out five consecutive nuclear tests of different equivalence and types, as well as strategic tests on medium range ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, etc The unremitting pursuit of equipment and even the initial breakthrough have been achieved. During the 60 years of North Korea's nuclear issue, all parties concerned have been in a state of "gradually fermenting, you come and go, fighting without breaking, spiraling". On the whole, it has not had a fundamental impact on North Korea's nuclear activities and nuclear strategy. On the contrary, it has become more and more pressing, more and more intense. The demands and Strategies of all parties are different The contradictions in other fields have given North Korea many strategic opportunities to get rid of difficulties and get involved in risks.
The author tends to think that North Korea's nuclear strategy has the following two characteristics: one is strong nuclear blackmail, the other is huge opacity. In the past decade, North Korea has more than once used nuclear activities as a threat to reach out to neighboring countries and even countries outside the region for policies and benefits, but after the policies and benefits, it only strategically suspended nuclear development. Using the words "today cut five cities, tomorrow cut ten cities, and then sleep all night, starting to see four areas, and Qin's soldiers have arrived" is not to be described as Yes, it's not too much nuclear blackmail to say it's a low profile version.
North Korea's nuclear weapon use strategy can be described as "not according to routine". General nuclear countries have mature theoretical system and use procedures in nuclear strategy. For example, the United States, based on the game theory thinking of Thomas middot Schelling and others, basically chose to start a war in the event of serious conventional military failure or full-scale nuclear attack on the mainland The procedure of nuclear attack should be discussed, and the intensity and mode of use of nuclear weapons should be carefully controlled. As for China, it directly declared that it would not open the nuclear counterattack procedure unless it was attacked by "landing nuclear attack".
For North Korea, because there is no published white paper on its nuclear strategy, it can only rely on external forces to evaluate its nuclear strategy, and North Korea's declaration of nuclear power in public is particularly arbitrary and offensive, such as threatening to carry out a "preemptive" nuclear attack on a certain country through the state media more than once, and to make a certain country 'all in disorder' At the military parade, the so-called "nuclear backpack" will be equipped at the individual level.
Of course North Korea doesn't